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Chapter 4
Risk Aversion and Pension
Investment Choices
Vickie L. Bajtelsmit and Jack L. VanDerhei
If current trends in mortality and labor force participation continue, re-
tirees in the twenty-first century can expect to live longer and healthier
lives than their twentieth-eentury counterparts.' This implies that, for
those baby boomers who survive to age 65, wealth and income in retire-
ment will need to be sufficient to support more than twenty years of re-
tirement.2 Since Social Security benefits replace only a small portion of
average pre-retirement earnings, they cannot necessarily be viewed as an
adequate safety net for individuals with insufficient savings, particularly
given the future tax increases that will be necessary to support promised
benefits beyond the early part of the next century.' It is therefore essen-
tial that today's workers be encouraged to make savings choices during
their working years that will enable them to achieve their retirement in-
come goals.
As a backdrop for exploring the future of pension policy, this chapter
focuses on the emergence of defined contribution plans as primary pen-
sion vehicles and the implications of this trend for plan participants and
their retirement income security. Recent theoretical and empirical evi-
dence concerning individual investment decisionmaking suggests that
individuals are more risk averse and have more diverse reasons for saving
than do their employers. They are therefore expected to allocate their
plan assets more conservatively, resulting in lower accumulated assets to
fund retirement. Furthermore, the diversity of individual characteristics
and needs implies that the allocations of individual participant accounts
can be expected to exhibit a great deal of variation. If risk aversion is
higher for certain groups, such as women, minorities, or low-income
households, greater conservatism in retirement investment will result in
lower income replacement for these groups.
Due to the lack of available data, most studies of defined contribution
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asset allocation have used aggregated data, and there have been rela-
tively few studies examining individual decisionmaking. The data set
used in this chapter includes information on a sample of 20,000 active
management participants for a single, large United States employer, as
well as valuable demographic information for each participant. We ex-
amine asset allocation decisions as a function of demographic character-
istics that have been suggested in the literature to be associated with risk
aversion. The empirical evidence indicates that demographic character-
istics of workers are important determinants of their allocation deci-
sions. Generally more conservative patterns of investment by women are
also found to exist. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications
and areas for further consideration.
The Emerging Importance of Defined
Contribution Plans
Predominance of New Plans
In the last decade, there have been significant changes in pension pro-
vision. Although Yakoboski and Silverman (1994) report that the much
publicized downward trend in pension sponsorship and participation
rates during the 1980s has apparently reversed direction, there are still
many employers that do not offer pension plans and, even when offered,
not all employees choose to participate. Based on tabulations by the Em-
ployment Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) of the April Current Popu-
lation Survey, 62.1 percent of all civilian nonagricultural wage and salary
workers age 16 and overwork for an employer where a plan is sponsored.
When a plan is available, 75.9 percent of these workers choose to partici-
pate. More than half of all workers in this category are not participating
in a plan.
Most new plans are of the defined contribution type, and these plans
are an increasing percentage of total plans. Eighty-four percent of all
plans offered are now defined contribution and, for 16 million partici-
pants, this plan is their primary plan. The total number of private-sector
qualified plans increased in number by 80,000 between 1985 and 1990.
However, during that period, the number of defined benefit plans de-
clined by 57,000 and that of defined contribution plans increased by
137,000.
Key Features of Defined Contribution Plans
The increasing proportion of defined contribution plans is related to
characteristics that distinguish them from defined benefit plans. The key
differences are related to risk bearing and investment decisionmaking.
Vickie L Bajtelsmit and Jack L. VanDe.he; 47
Risk Bearing
In defined contribution plans, ultimate retirement income is depen-
dent on the level of contributions made to the plan and the investment
performance of the participant's account. In comparison, defined bene-
fit plans typically provide retirement benefits based on years of service
and level of pay at retirement. Thus, defined contribution plan partici-
pants face much greater uncertainty regarding the expected level of
retirement benefits and increasing short-term investment risk as they
approach retirement. By comparison, the benefit promise to defined
benefit participants becomes more certain as they approach retirement.
It has been argued that the shifting of risk to employees is a trend that is
detrimental to retirement income security. However, when the trends
are examined carefully, it is apparent that most new plans are for small
employers (two to nine employees) who did not previously provide a re-
tirement plan at all. Since small employers are not substantially better
than their employees at bearing investment or inflation risk, the trend is
probably a net gain in that more individuals have access to tax-preferred
savings vehicles than previously.
From the standpoint of risk bearing, an advantage of defined contri-
bution plans over final average defined benefit plans is that they can
provide lump sum "cash-outs" for workers who leave the firm. Ifworkers
change jobs several times over their working careers, participation in a
different defined benefit plan at each employer will result in lower total
retirement income as compared to participation in a single plan for their
lifetime. This is due to the loss of inflation adjustment when benefits are
determined based on the last salary earned at a previous employer. In a
defined contribution plan, a participant who leaves his or her current
employer can roll over plan assets into a different retirement savings ve-
hicle, thus avoiding the penalty for mobility that is inherent in the de-
fined benefit plan.
Investment Decisionmaking
The second important characteristic of defined contribution plans is
that participants are often allowed to contribute additional funds to the
plans and are required to direct the allocation of their accounts into
different investment alternatives. Calculation of the current contribution
levels necessary to support future retirement is an extremely complex
actuarial and financial problem that requires estimates of investment re-
turns, future inflation, life expectancy, wage growth, and many other
factors. Most individuals simply do not have the mathematical skills nec-
essary to do more than ballpark the answer. As an aid to participant de-
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TABLE 1 Asset Allocations of Private Pension Plans with More Than
100 Participants, 1991
Asset Class
Cash Equivalents
Government Securities
Corporate Debt
Stock
Employer Securities
Other
Perrent of
DC Assets
13.0
10.0
7.8
26.6
38.5
4.1
Percent of
DB Assets
6.6
28.7
15.5
42.9
0.9
5.4
Source: U.S. Department of Labor tabulations of the 1991 Form 5500s.
cisionmaking, it is increasingly common for employers or plan providers
to provide participants with projections of expected retirement income.
For example, TIAA-CREF routinely provides tables of replacement ratios
resulting from specific investment choices for hypothetical entry and re-
tirement age scenarios (TIAA-CREF 1994).
The contribution decision is closely tied to the allocation decision,
since conservative investments will require greater current contribution
levels to achieve desired retirement goals. Evidence of allocations for
different types of plans indicates that defined contribution plans have
had lower allocations to equities than have defined benefit plans. Based
on the United States Department of Labor summary of the 1991 Form
5500 Annual Reports, Table 1 provides the percentage allocations to vari-
ous asset classes by single employer plans with more than 100 partici-
pants (excluding assets held in pooled or separate accounts, trusts, and
insurance company general accounts, for which asset allocation infor-
mation is not given). The allocation to equities (not including employe.'
stock) by defined benefit plans is nearly twice the equity allocation by de-
fined contribution plans.
Will Current Investment Decisions
Meet Retirement Goals?
Participation
Studies seem to indicate that the baby boom is not preparing adequately
for retirement. Bernheim (1993) compared simulated savings require-
ments to actual savings and found that, not including housing wealth,
baby boomers are saving at one-third the necessary rate, With housing
wealth included, they are still saving at only 84 percent of the necessary
rate. A study by Arthur D. Little, Inc. (1993) reached similar conclusions,
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estimating that even households with pension plans will fall far short of
retirement goals. Those headed by women and those without private
pensions will fare substantially poorer. Furthermore, since Social Secu-
rity currently replaces a large proportion of pre-retit-ement income for
these groups, any substantial alterations in that system will impact heavily
on their financial well-being relative to the rest of the population.
It could be argued that one of the best ways to encourage participa-
tion by employees in an employer-sponsored plan is for the employer to
offer a salary reduction plan with employer matching contributions. For
an employee in the 28 percent tax bracket, a one dollar contribution,
matched by the employer, is equivalent to receiving US $2.76 in current
income. Thus, in the absence of liquidity constraints, it would be ex-
pected that employees would contribute up to the maximum percentage
of compensation that is eligible for matching. However, the groups that
are more likely to be liquidity constrained are also the groups that have
shown lower levels of participation in the past. It is also possible that
secondary funding objectives, such as the purchase of a house or saving
for college tuition, will supersede retirement planning for younger fami-
lies, thus reducing participation.
Although participation percentages are higher for plans that offer em-
ployer matches, the difference is not as great as one might expect (77.8
percent as compared to 71.8 percent). The April 1993 Current Popula-
tion Survey data indicates that more than half of employers with salary
reduction plans provide matching contributions with an average match
rate of 65 percent for every dollar conu-ibuted by the employee. The
average contribution rate by participants in plans without matching was
slightly lower than those that provided matching (Yakoboski and Reilly
1994) .
Salary reduction plans are another means by which employees can in-
crease their overall savings level, and participation in these plans has
been increasing over time. During the period 1988 to 1993, the fraction
of workers participating in salary reduction plans, such as 401 (k) plans,
457 plans, and 403(b) plans, increased from 15.3 percent to 23.8 per-
cent, representing a 62 percent increase in the number of participants.
Among workers with an employer offering a salary reduction plan in
1993, 64.4 percent actually participated in the plan as compared to
57.0 percent in 1988 (Yakoboski and Silverman 1994).
Lump-Sum Distributions
There is evidence that many individuals who receive lump-sum distribu-
tions spend some or all of the distribution rather than preserving it on
a tax-deferred basis. Tabulations of the April 1993 Current Population
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SUIVey indicate that over 11 percent of the experienced labor force
aged 25 to 64 have received a lump-sum distribution from a pension or
retirement plan. Of these, 29 percent spent all of the money received,
21 percent rolled it over into another form of retirement savings, and
35 percent saved or invested it in some other form. Although the per-
centage of recipients who save the entire distribution shows an upward
trend, only 6 percent in 1980 and 15 percent for the years 1981 to 1986
did so. Nevertheless, the large percentage of distributions that are not
rolled over is cause for concern. Myopic treatment of lump-sum dis-
tributions reduces the ability of individuals to meet their retirement
income goals without substantial contributions in later years. The ad-
vantages normally attributed to defined contribution plans for individ-
uals who switch jobs several times over their lifetime disappear without
rollover of contributions to each plan.
With the increasing use of defined contribution plans, it is more likely
that individuals will receive distributions several times. The United States
Deparunent of Labor (1993) estimates that, between the ages of 18 and
30, the average number of jobs held is 7.5 (with a median of seven).
Although this number has increased over the last two decades, it is not
clear whether this has been due to greater job mobility, more involuntary
terminations, or some other factors. A recent examination ofjob tenure
figures for prime age workers (25 to 64 years) revealed that tenure levels
in the 1980s and early 1990s were actually higher than for comparable
age workers in the three previous decades.' Whether the larger number
ofjobs held by younger workers will make it more likely that participants
will spend lump-sum distributions is not clear but should certainly be
watched closely for its potential impact on retirement income security.
Provision of information regarding this issue should undoubtedly be an
important element of any participant education program.
Asset Allocation in Defined Contribution Plans
Although it is not clear that defined benefit plans are being replaced
with defined contribution plans, the increased prevalence of the latter
type of plan shifts much of the burden of retirement planning from em-
ployers to individuals.' Available evidence indicates that, in the aggre-
gate, defined contribution plan assets tend to be more conseIVatively
invested than their defined benefit counterparts, an indication that in-
dividuals are making different allocation decisions than professional
plan managers.
Greater conseIVatism by individuals could be due to a lack of knowl-
edge regarding the risk and return characteristics of invesunent alterna-
tives. The complexities of the economic and investment environment
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and the proliferation of different choices are confusing to even the best
informed and, although the variety of investment options offered under
salary reduction plans has increased, employers have shown reluctance
specifically to advise participants on investments." They recognize that
even if they carefully explain the potential fOt· short-term losses to partici-
pants, individuals do not have much patience in down markets. Evidence
of this can clearly be seen in the large volume of shares sold at the bot-
tom of the markets in 1987 and 1989.
Furthermore, financial experts are not in agreement regarding opti-
mal investment strategies for individuals over their life cycle. Clearly,
since individuals differ in time to retirement, level of income, home own-
ership, inheritance prospects, liquidity requirements for other major ex-
penditures, and other characteristics, their investmen t portfolios must
differ as well to satis/)' their particular needs. The pension portfolio is
only one part of the individual's wealth, which includes housing wealth,
human capital, Social Security wealth, and other assets. If the pension
allocation decision is made in the context of the individual's overall pon-
folio, ownership of other non-pension risky assets would imply that the
pension's allocation to risky assets should be adjusted downward. Since
managers of defined benefit plans are concerned primarily with meeting
the employers' benefit obligations as opposed to balancing pension port-
folio wealth with other participant investments, it is not surprising that
their allocation decisions would differ from those made by individual
participants.
Risk Versus Return
There is a general consensus based on historical data that, for long-term
investors, returns on equity portfolios will exceed returns on all other
asset classes. Average annual returns for stocks over the years 1964 to
1993 exceeded bond returns by more than 3 percent. If invested for
30 years at the average annual rates of return for that period of time, a
or.e dollar annual contribution to a stock fund in 1964 would have ac-
cumulated to almost nvice as much as the same investment in a bond
fund by 1993.' Although this is a simplified example, it illustrates the
powerful effect of long-term compounding. When inflation is taken into
account the proportionate difference in accumulation is greater, since
the "safe" investment returns do not always have positive real returns.
Treasury bills generated negative real after-tax returns in fourteen of the
years 1970 to 1991 (Williamson 1994).
If the higher returns on stocks are accompanied by higher risk, then
lower allocations to stocks in defined contribution plans may be a re-
flection of greater participant risk aversion. Although Siegel (1994) ar-
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gues that, for long holding periods, the risk of stock portfolios is lower
than that of bond portfolios, there is strong disagreement on this point
(Bodie 1995; Samuelson 1963 and 1989).
In Siegel's study of nearly 200 years of returns on different asset port-
folios, he shows that even in the worst (meaning worst for stocks and best
for bonds) post-1926 thirty-year period, stock investment accumulations
were three times that of bond investments. He demonstrates that, for
long-term investors (twenty-year holding periods), the risk as measured
by standard deviation of holding period returns is even lower than that
of T-bills. For shorter time horizons there is less time diversification and
therefore the reductions in risk are lower but still substantial. Further-
more, the investment strategies commonly referred to as "low risk" may
in fact be the highest risk. Siegel finds that, for longer holding periods,
real returns on fixed-income assets become relatively less certain. Bodie
(1995) argues that, although the probability of a shortfall declines over
the long run, this ignores the potential size of the shortfall. He models
insurance against shortfall risk as a put option and shows that the price
of this option actually increases with the time to maturity, thus casting
doubt on the conventional wisdom regarding long-run stock investment
risk.
An interesting aspect of this debate is the different impact that long-
run stock investment may have on defined contribution versus defined
benefi t pensions. If Siegel's observations of past historical patterns hold
true for the future, then it would seem that participants would be better
served by investing substantial portions of their retirement portfolio in
equities, at least until they are closer to retil-ement, and in fact this is dle
strategy often recommended by investment advisors. However, for de-
fined contribution participants, the success of this strategy is sensitive to
the choice of retirement date and may necessitate delaying retirement if
the stock market does particularly poorly in the years immediately pre-
ceding that date_ In contrast, a~ long as employers have an age-diversified
set of employees, they will be better able to take advantage of time di-
versification, a fact that may explain the greater stock allocations in de-
fined benefit plans.
Evidence of Individual Risk Aversion and Myopia
It is a generally accepted principle that investors do not make decisions
based solely on expected outcomes, but also consider the possibility of
deviation from the mean. The way in which individuals trade risk and
return is subject to dispute,· and decision theorists argue that behavioral
decisions over uncertain outcomes are made with reference to a system
ofjudgments and beliefs that are often based on faulty reasoning.9 For
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individuals with high levels of risk aversion or loss aversion, a low-risk
strategy will result in greater current utility. Unfortunately, over a long-
term investment horizon, a short-term, low-risk investment strategy can
result in negative real return. Although the available data regarding in-
dividual investment decisionmaking is not ideal for analyzing the issue
of risk aversion, there have been several studies that provide evidence
supporting the hypothesis that individuals exhibit some degree of risk
aversion and myopia with regard to consumption. A recent study by Jia-
nakoplos and Bernasek (1994) reports that, in the Sun'eys of Consumer
Finances, when responses are sample weighted, 51.08 percent of all
women in 1983, and 57.12 percent in 1989, indicated that they were not
willing to take any financial risks at all. Compared to the men's responses
of 36.4 percent for 1983 and 40.66 percent in 1989, and without control-
ling for other factors, women appear to be more risk averse than men.
However, ifwomen tend to have lower income and there is a correlation
between income and risk-taking behavior, then the lower risk taking
could be an income effect rather than a gender-related effect. In addi-
tion, if women are not the head-of-household, their risk aversion may not
have as great an impact on household wealth.
The survey evidence of risk aversion in pension allocations is mixed. A
Hewitt Associates (1993) survey found that where GICs were offered,
they accounted for 47 percent of employee contributions, indicating
fairly low risk tolerance. Employer stock accounted for 33 percent of em-
ployee contributions and 67 percent of employer contributions. Equity
and balanced funds had much smaller average shares, accounting for
only 21 percent and 13 percent respectively of employee contributions.
Fidelity Investments, on the other hand, reports that, for companies with
an employer stock option, 45.5 percent of plan assets were in equity
(other than company stock), 16 percent in company stock, 28.7 percent
in GICs.'O Without a company stock alternative, the stock and GICs each
had larger shares (52.4 percent and 34.2 percent). Goodfellow and
Schieber (this volume) report 52.8 percent of assets in their sample in-
vested in GICs.
Another potential explanation for participant allocations is that they
have a shorter time horizon for decisionmaking. In early working years,
savings may be targeted toward housing, then for college expenditures.
Alternatively, individuals may simply have a strong preference for cur-
rent consumption. Often termed "myopia," short-sighted decision hori-
zons may not be irrational but may instead be evidence that prevailing
life cycle theories are flawed. However, one of the reasons for passage of
Social Security and, later, ERISA was the observed failure of individuals
to save adequately for the future. Although it could be argued that alter-
native reasons for saving are legitimate, the fact remains that inadequate
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savings, or inadequate accumulation ofsavings due to overly conservative
investment by a large segment of the population, can have serious impli-
cations for the future.
An additional observation regarding conservatism in investment allo-
cations is that individuals tend to exhibit inertia (i.e., they do not change
their allocations in response to changes in age or in the market). A study
examining allocations between the TIAA fixed income alternative and
the CREF equities fund found that the vast majority of individuals picked
a 50-50 mix and did not alter their allocations in later periods. In some
ways, this finding is consistent with a strategy of investing more in equi-
ties in later years, since the better performance of the equities account
will increase the allocation to that account over time. However, failure to
change allocations as retirement approaches would probably result in an
overly risky portfolio in later years. Furthermore, in many fixed income
alternatives, there are restrictions on changing allocations of balances,
which makes large portfolio shifts impossible (for example, TIAA re-
stricts movements out of their guaranteed contracts to 10 percent of the
balance per year).
Investment in Employer Securities
Many defined contribution plans now offer the opportunity for partici-
pants to invest all or part of their pension contributions in the plan spon-
sor's stock. For example, in the Hewitt sample above, 40 percent of the
plans offered employer stock as an investment alternative for employee
contributions and 50 percent offered it for employer contributions. Al-
though one of the arguments originally put forth in favor of Employee
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) was that stock ownership would give em-
ployees incentive to work harder for "their own company," empirical
evidence has shown only a weak relationship between employee stock
ownership and stock returns (Kruse 1992). Furthermore, Conte andJam-
pani (1996) find that, although ESOP returns are higher than diversified
equity portfolios, they are substantially liskier and, on a risk-adjusted ba-
sis, are substantially lower than those of diversified plans.
There are several possible explanations for popularity of employer
stock invesunents. In some cases, high allocations to this asset class are
due to restrictions on the employer match, which can be entirely in em-
ployer stock. However, employees often choose employer stock on their
own. This may be because they feel they have an informational advan-
tage over other investors in their employer's stock. Ownership of em-
ployer stock may give employees an "illusion of control" (Kahneman,
Slovic, and Tversky 1987) over the performance of their investment as
compared to alternatives that appear to be more volatile. It is also pos-
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sible that individuals consider invesunent in employer stock the least
risky of the invesunent alternatives, offering equity-like returns without
the same level of perceived risk. A past history of good performance may
add to this misconception." Finally, the negative signal inherent in com-
pany managers selling their employer stock might result in allocations
that exceed employees' desired allocations to that asset category. This
may be particularly the case where employer matches are given in the
form of employer stock.
Regardless of the past and current performance of an employer's
stock, the fact remains that investment of pension dollars in employer
stock violates one of the most basic rules of investing. Not only is the
pension undiversified, but the employee has both human and financial
capital tied to the success or failure of a single business. In the extreme,
the failure of the employer, particularly when retirement is imminent,
could be disastrous. Even without failure, poor stock performance late
in a person's working career could severely impact retirement wealth. For
example, if the employer's stock dropped in value just prior to retire-
ment, it would result in a percentage decline in pension annuity compa-
rable to the percentage decline in total portfolio value. It is doubtful that
plan participants fully realize the extent of the risk they assume in invest-
ing in employer stock and, for obvious reasons, it is even more doubtful
that any employer is going to tell them not to do so.
Is Risk Aversion a Group Characteristic?
The usual argument regarding differences in risk aversion is that "in
the small" they make little difference (Pratt 1964). However, if certain
groups exhibit largely different levels of risk aversion, there may be
important implications for pension policy that go beyond mere prefer-
ences. For example, if wealthy households exhibit less aversion to invest-
ment risk than their poorer counterparts, "in the large" the net effect
will be a wider wealth gap in retirement. 12
More perplexing are the implications of risk preferences across race
and gender. There is an economics literature that links risk-taking be-
havior to economic success, which depends upon, among other things,
the decisions made over the lifetime that affect wages, income, and
wealth. Observed wealth and income differences by race and gendel',
although often argued to be the result of discrimination, are also poten-
tially explainable as the result of greater risk aversion exhibited by these
groups. If this is the case, then the recent trend toward giving individuals
greater control over their retirement invesunents could be particularly
detrimental to elderly women who will be supporting their longer retire-
ment period with less accumulated wealth than their male counterparts.
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In addition, although the wage gap has narrowed in the last two de-
cades, women and racial minorities still tend to earn less than white
males in equivalent jobs, a fact that implies even greater retirement in-
come inequality.
Although there is historical evidence that elderly women have never
been as well off as their male counterparts, this may be the result of years
oflower wages and labor force participation as opposed to differences in
risk tolerance. At least for older generations, it was common for a woman
to enter the labor force after the children were in school and, with lower
education and experience, her lower income was considered secondary
to her husband's.
The evidence on investmem risk taking is not clear. Jianakoplos and
Bernasek (1994) were unable to show any significant gender- or race-
related differences in risk preferences after controlling for other ex-
planatory characteristics such as savings, home ownership, insurance,
and other assets. Riley and Chow (1992) find that asset holdings of
women exhibit greater risk aversion than those of men, but they do not
control for other characteristics such as age, income, and wealth. How-
ever, Hinz et al. (this volume) analyze recent survey data from the Thrift
Savings Plan for federal governmem workers and find that gender
differences in investing persist even after controlling for demographic
differences.
Evidence from Individual Level Data
Sample Description
The sample of 20,000 managemem employees used in this study is based
on the information supplied by a large United States employer and in-
cludes demographic, wage, and pension information on the firm's em-
ployees for calendar year 1993. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for
TABLE 2 Sample Descriptive Statistics (n = 16,963)
Standard
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Deviation
Age 43.88 22.95 64.98 8.53
Female 0.30 0 I 0.45
Tenure 17.58 1.91 46.97 9.06
on-caucasian 0.17 0 1 0.37
Accumulated 401 (k) balance 73.84 0 892.49 78.08
(in US $l,OOOs)
Source: Authors' calculations based on sample firm's internal records for 1993.
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TABLE 3 Portfolio Allocations for Sample, by Gender
Investment Choice
Beginning of Year 1993
Account Alwcation
Men Women
(n=11,863) (n=5100)
Allocation for 1993
Contrilmtions
Men Women
(n = 11,863) (n = 5100)
Employer Stock
Diversified Equity
Portfolio
Fixed Income
(Government
Bonds and GICs)
41.0%
14.2%
44.8%
42.1%
12.9%
45.0%
42.4%
18.8%
38.8%
43.5%
16.7%
39.8%
Source: Authors' calculations based on sample firm's internal records.
this sample. There are nearly twice as many men as women and, as might
be expected, men are overrepresented in the sample of employees near-
ing retirement and those in the higher salary ranges.
The employer provided five investment alternatives for the plan par-
ticipants during this time period, including employer stock, a diversified
equity portfolio, a government bond portfolio, a guaranteed interest
fund (GIG), and a socially responsible equity fund. In order to better
distinguish low-risk and high-risk strategies, the GIC and government
bond allocations are consolidated in the following analysis and discus-
sion. Given the nonfinancial objectives that may influence the social
choice fund, we exclude this asset class from the analysis. The allocation
percentages for the reweigh ted account balances as of the beginning of
year 1993 and for the 1993 contributions are given in Table 3 by gender.
Empirical Methodology
The empirical hypothesis is that employee characteristics will have an
affect on the likelihood of allocation to particular asset classes. As in
Him et al. (this volume), we estimate the Tobit under the assumption
that the data are censored (i.e., observation of bunching at the extremes
of the allocation choices indicates that the participants might have pre-
ferred to invest in portfolios with lower or higher risk than those offered
in the plan).
Allocation Decisions
Tables 4 and 5 repon the results for three different dependent vari-
ables: percent allocation to fixed income (government bonds and GICs);
TABLE 4 Determinants of Investment Allocations for 401 (k) Account Balances
Dej)enr1ent Variable
(J) Percent in Fixed Income (2) Peramt in Jcquities (3) Percent in Employer Stock
Independent Coeffic. Prob Coeffic. Prob COfjfiC. Prob
Variables (Std. En.) > Chi (Std. Err.) > Chi (Std. hr.) > Chi
,intercept 0.3674 0.0035 0.1476 0.1513 0.2153 0.0677(0.1258) (0.1029) (0.1178)
Age -0.0205 0.0042 -0.0066 0.2071 0.0201 0.0007(0.0063) (0.0052) (0.0060)
Age' 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.1762 -0.0003 0.0001(0.0001) (0.0001 ) (0.0001)
Female 0.0330 0.0026 0.0035 0.7067 -0.0251 0.0142(0.0109) (0.0092) (0.0102)
Tenure 0.0204 0.0001 -0.0360 0.0001 0.0105 ().ODD1(0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0027)
Tenure' -0.0005 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0004(0.0001 ) (0.0001 ) (0.0001)
Salary 0.0032 0.0001 0.0023 0.0001 -0.0052 0.0001(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Race -0.0003 0.9840 -0.0101 0.3606 0.0056 0.6468(0.0131 ) (0.0110) (0.0122)
401 (k) Wealth -0.0017 0.0001 0.0012 0.0001 0.0018 0.0001(0.0001 ) (0.00012) (0.0001)
401 (k) Wealth' 2.0906£-6 0.0001 -1.383E-6 0.0001 -2.69£-6 0.0001(3.21E-7) (2.57E-7) (3.27E-7)
SouTce: Authors' calculations.
TABLE 5 Determinants ofAllocations for Current Contributions
Dependent Variable
(1) Percent in Fixed Income (2) Percent in Equities (3) Percent in Employer Stock
Independent COf'jfic. hob Coeffic. Prob Coeffic. Prob
Variables (Std. Err.) > Chi (Std. to'rr.) > Chi (Std. En) > Chi
Intercept 0.1433 0.3980 0.0715 0.5884 0.3738 0.0080(0.1696) (0.1324) (0.1410)
Age -0.0188 0.0270 -0.0076 0.2598 0.0201 0.0050(0.0086) (0.0067) (0.0072)
Age' 0.0003 0.0009 0.0001 0.2742 -0.0003 0.0002(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Female 0.0457 0.0020 0.0045 0.7028 -0.0388 0.0016(0.0148) (0.0118) (0.0123)
Tenure 0.0203 0.0001 -0.0356 0.0001 0.0060 0.0656(0.0039) (0.0031) (0.0033)
Tenure' -0.0004 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0777(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001 )
Salary 0.0020 0.0001 0.0031 0.0001 -0.0058 0.000\(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Race 0.0088 0.6208 -0.0285 0.0438 0.0165 0.2604(0.0177) (0.0141 ) (0.0147)
401 (k) Wealth -0.0022 0.0001 0.0014 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
401 (k) Wealth' 2.5656£-6 0.0001 -1.569E-6 0.0001 -1.902F.-6 0.0001(4.41 E-7) (3.36£-7) (4.28£-7)
Source: Authors' calculations.
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percent al1ocation to diversified equities; and percent al1ocation to em-
ployer stock. For each asset category, the al1ocation is measured in two
ways. Table 4 reports the empirical results for the likelihood ofallocation
for the account balance, which is measured as the dol1ar value of assets
in the category divided by the total account balance. The estimated
model for al1ocation of current contributions, measured as the dol1ar
investment in the category for 1993 divided by the total contributions for
1993, is reported in Table 5. Although it might seem that these would be
highly correlated, if pension participants tend to modify al1ocations for
new contributions without modifying allocations in account balances,
then both specifications have informational value. The account balance
allocation is obviously a better indication of overall riskiness of the port-
folio, but the current contribution al1ocation is more likely to capture
changes that are made in response to changing life circumstances, such
asjob tenure, age, and accumulated wealth.
Explanatory Variables
The data set includes valuable demographic information on plan par-
ticipants that al10ws us to control for factors that are hypothesized to
influence risk preference and thus the likelihood of certain investment
choices. Gender and race (defined as Caucasian or non-Caucasian) are
binary variables, whereas the age, length of employment (tenure), sal-
ary, and total defined contribution savings (401 (k) wealth) are continu-
ous. To control for expected non-linearities in age, tenure, and wealth,
squared terms were also used as controls. The results for the account
balance allocations and the current contributions do not differ substan-
tially in that the same variables are found to influence both decisions.
Therefore, the following discussion applies to the results in both Tables
4 and 5.
Gender Effects
Consistent with existing theoretical and empirical literature, we find
that the women in this sample are more likely to invest in the fixed-
income alternative than are their male counterparts. Although fixed-
income investment is less risky than stock investment, we do not nec-
essarily view this result as conclusive evidence of gender differences in
risk aversion. Missing information on marital status and other household
wealth and income make it impossible to draw such a general conclu-
sion. Although gender does not have a strong influence on diversified
equity al1ocation, the employer stock results show that women are less
likely than men to invest in this asset class.
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Age andJob Tenure. Money managers often recommend a life-<:ycle ap-
proach to investment allocation. Although specific allocations may dif-
fer, this type of strategy usually results in lower-risk portfolios in the early
years of work (when individuals have a greater need for liquidity), in-
creasing allocation to equities during mid-work years, and reduced riski-
ness of the portfolio as retirement approaches. The coefficients on age
and age-squared for the fixed-income allocation tend to support the
non-linearity of the allocation decision over time. Age has a significant
negative effect on the fixed-income allocation, but the positive sign on
the squared term implies that the function has a minimum and that,
at higher ages, individuals begin increasing their allocation to fixed-
income securities. The age effect on allocations to employer securities is
also non-linear, but shows the reverse pattern: allocations increase with
age to a maximum, after which they decrease, a pattern that is consistent
with a reduction in risk as retirement approaches.
Mter controlling for age, the impact ofjob tenure on the allocation
decision was found to be one of considerable risk aversion for the first
few years of employment with the sponsor, followed by a more aggressive
asset allocation thereafter. Regression results (not included) with a series
of dummy variables for age and tenure provided significant differences
at all ages for the likelihood of investing in fixed-income assets between
short- and long-tenure employees." In Tables 4 and 5, tenure has a sig-
nificant positive effect on the fixed-income allocation, but the negative
sign on the squared term implies that the function has a maximum and
that, at longer tenures, individuals begin decreasing their allocation to
fixed-income securities. The tenure effect on allocations to equities is
also non-linear, but shows the reverse pattern: allocations decrease with
tenure to a minimum, after which they increase.
Wealth and Income
The participants' pension account balance is used as a proxy for the
miss;ng household wealth variable and is shown to exhibit non-Iinearities
indicative of a concave (risk-averse) utility function. The allocation to
equities increases with wealth but at a decreasing rate, supporting the
hypothesis of decreasing relative risk aversion. This variable has a similar
impact on the employer stock allocation, showing that individuals are
treating this as they would other risky investments.
Although salary appears positively to influence allocations to both
fixed-income and equity securities, this effect is undoubtedly influenced
by the significant negative relationship between salary and employer
stock. This would be expected if the sponsor's stock options are positively
correlated with employee salary.
62 Risk Aversion and Pension Investment Choices
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The trend toward giving individuals more control over investment of
their defined contribution accounts has caused concern among pension
economists who fear that overly conservative investment by risk-averse
individuals will translate into lower retirement income. If certain groups,
particularly those that already have lower income and wealth, exhibit dif-
ferent risk preferences, income and wealth differentials in retirement
will be even greater. Existing theoretical work suggests that higher levels
of risk aversion are associated with lower wealth, but empirical studies
related to pension investing have been hampered by inadequacy of avail-
able data.
In this study, we used a rich database of employee pension and demo-
graphic characteristics to examine the hypothesis that individual char-
acteristics are important determinants of pension allocation decisions.
The general results indicate that investment allocations for this sample
are consistent with an assumption of decreasing relative risk aversion.
However, allocations to stock and fixed-income alternatives show a life-
cycle pattern that conforms to expectations. As expected, those with
shorter time horizons for investment and those with alternative motiva-
tions for saving are more inclined to invest in fixed-income securities,
an empirical finding that is largely consistent with our hypotheses. Al-
though more than one-third of all of the plan assets are invested in low-
risk, low-return assets, the fact that this strategy is being used primarily
by younger employees and those approaching retirement does not im-
ply, as some have suggested, that individuals are generally too risk averse
in their investing behavior.
Our results also provide evidence that gender has a significant effect
on allocation decisions. Specifically, the women in this sample are signifi-
cantly more likely to invest in fixed-income securities and are less likely
to invest in employer stock. However, since we are missing important
information on household wealth and marital status, this result does not
necessarily imply that elderly women will be worse off in retirement.
Given the potentially serious consequences of inadequate retirement
wealth for women, this is an issue that deserves further examination.
Notes
1. For a recent discussion of the issues related to retirement and longevity,
see Munnell (1991).
2. It is not currently expected that longer lives will imply retirement at older
ages. In fact, the trend is to earlier retirement. In the 1980s, two-thirds of all men
over the age of 60 were retired from the labor force. See Ransom, Sutch, and
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Williamson (1991). Fries (1991), however, shows that although life expectan-
cies have lengthened over the last decades, the average age of disability has not
changed' substantially.
3. [n 1990, for those retired households with income at or more than three
times the government-determined poverty level (US $18,804 for a single person
age 65 or over), Social Security benefits represented only 25 percent of retire·
ment income. For higher income retirees, these benefits will be an even less im-
portant sources of income; see Yakoboski and Silverman (1994).
4. These figures are based on compilation by the Employee Benefits Re-
search Institllle of United States Department of Labor statistics and reported in
Yakoboski and Silverman (1994).
5. Silverman (1993) reports that although the number of primary defined
benefit plans declined over the period 1985-1989, two-thirds of the decline was
in plans with fewer than nine participants, and the number oflarge defined bene·
fit plans has remained stable. At the same time, there has been a large increase
in the nwnber of defined contribution plans across all plan sizes, indicating that
the increases were not simply the result of shifts from one type to the other.
6. According to a Hewitt (1993) survey, 4.5 choices are offered on average,
with equity options being offered by 89 percent of the plans. Other popular op-
tions are money market accounts, GICs, and employer stock.
7. See Ibbotson Associates, Chicago as cited in Blair and Sellers (1994). With
annual compounding, an annuity of one dollar for 30 years at 10.5 percent (the
thirty-year holding period return for stocks over that period) has a future value
of US $180.88. The comparable bond investment with annual interest 01'7.4 per·
cent has a future value of US $101.54. Equivalently stated, the stock investor
could have reduced their annual contribution to US $0.56 and achieved the same
portfolio value as the one dollar annual contribution to the bond fund.
8. Mossin (1968) suggested that investors may exhibit partial myopia, having
utility functions characterized as constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) or con-
stant absolute risk aversion (CARA). With CRRA, they will choose portfolios each
period as if that period were their last. With a risk free asset choice, the utility
function will be CARA. Musumeci and Musumeci (1996) perform dynamic pro-
gramming simulations under different utility assumptions and find that simu-
lated outcomes with partial myopia utility is consistent with observed patterns of
investing (i.e., greater proportions in the low-risk asset choices).
9. For a discussion of these generally invalid heuristics and biases, see Kahne-
man, Slovic, and Tversky (1987). As an example in the investment context, indi-
viduals may estimate the probability ofa stock market crash by use of the heuristic
called "availability" which essentially states that if you can remember a recent
OCCUITence of an event, you will judge it more likely to occur in the future. A
similar rule of thumb in judgments of unknown probability is that a short se-
quence of events is indicative of a pattern, so that a recent period of rising stock
price will imply that, in the next period, the stock price will also rise.
10. The Fidelity data included over 1500 plans and 2 million participants as of
June 30,1994.
11. In a study of returns on ESOPs, Conte andJampani (1996) found substan-
tially higher returns in ESOPs than for the control group of diversified defined
contribution plans, but this greater return was accompanied by greater risk. On
a risk-adjusted basis, the returns to large ESOPs were similar to diversified plans
but those of smaller ESOPs were substantially lower.
12. For example, Palsson's (1993) cross-sectional study of Swedish households
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finds that wealthy households exhibit greater investment risk tolerance than do
poorer households.
13. Alternative thresholds of three-, five-, and seven-year job tenures produced
similar results.
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